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THE PRESUMPTION OF INNOCENCE
IN THE SOVIET UNION
George P. Fletcher*
I.

INTRODUCTION

The presumption of innocence is a curious item in the baggage

of Western legal rhetoric. Revered today here and abroad,' it has
become a standard clause in international testimonials to the rights
of man. 2 Yet, at first blush, it seems conceptually anomalous and
irrelevant in practice. It is hardly a presumption of fact-a distillation of common experience; statistics betray the suggestion
that men indicted on criminal charges are likely to be innocent.
Nor is it a legal rule masquerading as an irrebuttable presumption;

it is rebuttable by proof beyond a reasonable doubt of the defendant's guilt. Further, it is hard to see what the presumption of innocence adds to the rules already applied by Western courts. Both
common law and civilian courts apply rules requiring the trier-offact to acquit in cases of doubt on the material facts. And these
rules on the prosecutor's burden of persuasion are neither logically
nor historically derivative of a presumption of innocence. 8
* Assistant Professor of Law, University of Washington; Visiting Associate
Professor of Law, Boston College Law School, 1968-69.
1 The common law presumption of innocence crystallized in early 19th century
cases on the burden of persuasion in private disputes; the courts held that men be
presumed to have performed their legal obligations and thus that the plaintiff must
prove that the defendant failed so to act. This presumption, which in time came
to be called the presumption of innocence, was invoked to circumvent the general
rule that one need not prove a negative proposition. See, e.g., Williams v. East India
Co., 102 Eng. Rep. 571 (K.B. 1802). The French prisomption d'innocence derives
from section 9 of the 1789 Declaration of the Rights of Man. By virtue of German
adherence to the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental
Freedoms, the Unschuldsvermutung (innocence-presumption) is now firmly rooted
in West German legal rhetoric. For further discussion and documentation of the
presumption's status in West Germany and France, see Fletcher, Two Kinds of Legal
Rules: A Comparative Study of Burden-of-PersuasionPractices in Criminal Cases, 77
YALE L.J. 880-81 nn.1-5 (1968). Concerning the presumption in the German Democratic Republic, see Herrmann, Die Prsumtion der Unschuld-ein die Geselischaftswirksamkeit des sozialistichen Strafverfahrens verstirkendes Prinzip, in (1962) STAAT
UND RECHT 1965.

2 See Universal Declaration of Human Rights, art. 11(2), U.N. Doc. A/811
(1948), reprinted in 43 AM. J. INT'L L. 127 (Supp. 1949) ; Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, Nov. 4, 1950, art. 6(2), 213
U.N.T.S. 222, 228.
8 The common law rule that the prosecutor must prove guilt beyond a reasonable
doubt emerged in the early 19th century. One of the earliest references to the
rule is L. MAcNALLY, THE RULES OF EvENcE ON PLEAS OF THE CRowN 398 (1811).
It wasn't until the 1850's that, judges began to equate the presumption of innocence
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Despite the apparent redundancy of the presumption of innocence, Soviet jurists have clashed for the last two decades on its
role in the Soviet legal system. Their concern has not been anything
so practical as the risk of non-persuasion in criminal cases. With
few exceptions, Soviet courts have repeatedly applied the civilian
maxim in dubio pro reo requiring acquittal in cases of doubt.'
Andrej Vyshinskij was virtually alone in his dissent from that rule.5
With consensus on the burden of persuasion, Soviet scholars have
directed their analytic acumen to the more sublime question: Does
the presumption of innocence exist in Soviet law and if so, what
does it mean?
The Soviet debate on the presumption of innocence began with
fury in the first few years after the Second World War. 6 One of
the first endorsements of the presumption as a doctrine of Soviet
law came from Professor Strogovich, a leading theoretician of
with the rule on the prosecutor's burden of persuasion. See, e.g., Patterson v. State, 21
Ala. 571 (1852). Similarly, German scholars initially rejected the phrase "presumtion of innocence" as a misuse of legal terminology. See K. MOSER, IN DuBio PRO REO
77 (1933). But they have long subscribed to the maxim in dubio pro reo, which
requires triers-of-fact to acquit in cases of doubt. For further discussion and documentation of these points, see Fletcher, supra note 1, at 880-81 nn.2-5.
4 M. STROGOVICH, KuRs SOVETSKOGO UGOLOVNOGO PROTSESSA [A COURSE IN
SOVIET CRIMINAL PROCEDURE) 189-92 (1958). Soviet appellate courts aggressively
review trial convictions and readily reverse convictions where it appears that the
evidence was insufficient to support a finding of guilt. See, e.g., In re Krasavin, 2 Sud.
Prak. Verkh. Suda S.S.S.R. 23 (Sup. Ct. U.S.S.R. 1955) (conviction of theft reversed where the defendant had introduced eight witnesses at trial to support his claim
of alibi); In re Kalinin, 10 Sub. Prak. Verkh. Suda S.S.S.R. 17 (Sup. Ct. U.S.S.R. 1946)
(conviction of embezzlement of state funds reversed; defendant had claimed that the
money had been stolen from him on a streetcar). The latter case is significant because the court referred expressly to the presumption of innocence in its opinion supporting reversal. For a discussion of contrary rules in the 1930's, see H. BERMAN,
SOVIET CRIMINAL LAW AND PROCEDURE:

THE RSFSR CODES 80-81 (1966).

5 Adopting principles of the English common law, Vyshinskij held that the accused must prove all defensive claims. A. VYSHNSKi,
TEORIJA SUDEBNYKH
DOKAZATEL'STV SOVETSKOM PRAVE [THEORY OF JUDICIAL EVIDENCE IN SOVIET LAW]
240-46 (3d ed. 1950). See also Tadevosjan, K voprosu ob ustanovlenii material'noj
istiny v sovetskom protsesse [On the Question of Ascertaining Material Truth in
Soviet Procedure], 1948 SOVETSKOE OOSUDARSTVO I PRAVO

[SOVIET STATE AND LAW]

65, 71 (No. 6) (agreeing with Vyshinskij). Vyshinskij's reading of the common law is
basically accurate. See 4 W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *201. See generally Fletcher,
supra note I, at 902. For a biting contemporary critique of Vyshinskij's position on
the burden of persuasion, see V. ARSEN'EV, VOPROSY OBSHCHEJ TEORII SUDEBNYKH
DOKAZATEL'STV [PROBLEMS IN THE GENERAL THEORY OF JUDICIAL EVIDENCE] 76-77

(1964).
6 For an example of the early literature, see V. KAMINSKAJA,

UCHENIE 0

PRAVOVYKH PREZUMPTSIJAKH V UGOLOVNOM PROTSESSE [THE DOCTRINE OF LEGAL
PRESUMPTIONS IN CRIMINAL PROCEDURE] (1948). Tsarist materials also contain references to the presumption of innocence. See S. POZNYSHEV, ELEMENTARNYJ UCHEBNIK
RUSSKAGO UGOLOVNAGO PROTSESSA [ELEMENTARY TEXTBOOK ON RUSSIAN CRIMINAL
PROCEDURE] 51 (1913); V. SLUCHEVSKIJ, UCHEBNIK" RUSSKAGO UGOLOVNAGO PROTSESSA [TEXTBoOK ON RUSSIAN CRIMINAL PROCEDURE] 63-64 (1892).
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Soviet criminal law. 7 Since the initial flurry of activity, at least a
score of articles have focused on the subject. With the literature
almost unanimously supportive of the presumption, expectations
were high that the draftsmen of the 1958 Fundamental Principles
of Criminal Procedure would codify the presumption as a fundamental doctrine of Soviet law. Yet, hints of rejection appeared in
a 1958 article,8 and in December 1958, B. S. Shirkov, Deputy to
the Supreme Soviet, denounced the presumption as "a worm-eaten
dogma of bourgeois doctrine." 9 Official bypassing of the presumption in 1958 prompted some proceduralists to delete discussions of
0
it in the new editions of their texts on criminal procedure.' It appeared that the presumption of innocence might pass from the
rhetoric of Soviet law. Then, in a number of articles published in
1
1964, Russian jurists rekindled the dying debate. The presumption had regained sufficient vitality by 1965 to gain recognition in
a new encyclopedia of Soviet legal concepts. 2 Despite its omission
from the 1958 Fundamental Principles, the noble presumption per5
sists as an important doctrine in Soviet legal rhetoric."
7

See M.

STROGOVICH, UCHENIE 0 MATERIAL'NOJ ISTINE V UGOLOVNOM PROTSESSE

[THE DOCTRINE OF MATERIAL TRUTH IN CRIMINAL PROCEDURE] (1947).

8 Baranov, Ob Osnovakh ugolovnogo sudoproizvodstva SSSR [On the Fundamental Principles of Criminal Proceedings in the Soviet Union], 1958 SOTSIALISTICHESKAJA
ZAKONNOST' [SOCIALIST LEGALITY] 8, 10 (No. 3).
9 Pravda, December 27, 1958, at 5.
10 See M. CHEL'TSOV, SOVETSKIJ UGOLOVNYf PROTSESS [SovIET CRIMINAL PROCEDURE] 127-28 (4th ed. 1962); I. CHUTHIN, L. MARIUPOL'SKII, & I. SHEREMET'EV,
SOVETSKIJ UGOLOVNYJ PROTSESS [SOVIET CRIMINAL PROCEDURE] 76 (1960).

11 Filiminov, 0 funktsijakh suda i sledstvija [On the Functions of the Court and
of the Investigation], Literaturnaja Gazeta, Aug. 18, 1964, at 2; Gorkin, 0 sotsialisticheskom pravosudii [Socialist Justice] Izvestie, Dec. 2, 1964, at 3; Strogovich,
Otvet prokuroru [Answer to the Procurator], Literaturnaja Gazeta, Aug. 18, 1964, at
2; Strogovich, Sudebnaja oshibka [Judicial Error], Literaturnaja Gazeta, May 23,
1964, at 5.
12 ENTSIKLOPEDICHESKI SLOVAR',PRAVOVYKH ZNANIJ [ENCYCLOPEDIC DICTIONARY
OF LEGAL CONCEPTS] 359-69 (S.Bratus' & N. Zhegin eds. 1965).

13 The nature of the Soviet debate has been widely misunderstood in the
Western press. See, e.g., Binkley, The Rule of Law: The New Soviet Criminal Procedure, 46 A.B.A.J. 637 (1960), in which the author intimates that a standard of proof
less stringent than proof of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt prevails in Soviet
criminal courts. This is plainly false. See note 4 supra. For an example of the political
uses of comparative legal criticism, see Gillingham, Russia Stages a New "Show" Trial,
New York Times, August 14, 1960, VI, at 13, in which the author claims that the
1958 legislative rejection of the presumption of innocence led to a presumption of
guilt in Soviet law. Id. at 84. For more responsible accounts of the Soviet debate on
the presumption of innocence, see the writings of Harold Berman cited in note 14
infra; Bilinsky, Die Priisumtion der Unschuld in der sowjetischen Rechtslehre, 1962
RECHT IN OST UND WEST 55; Kiralfy, The Campaign for Legality in the U.S.S.R., 6
INT'L & COmP. L.Q. 625, 638 (1957). For a perceptive analysis of many of the issues
in the Soviet law of evidence that underlie the debate on the presumption of innocence, see Ginsburgs, Objective Truth and the Judicial Process in Post-Stalinist Soviet
Jurisprudence, 10 AM. J. CoMp. L. 53 (1961).
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With good cause, one wonders why Soviet jurists are so intrigued by the presumption of innocence. If it is merely a prestigious
redundancy, why shouldn't they embrace the term and be done
with it? On the other hand, if it is more than a rule on the risk of
non-persuasion, why do they seem singularly incapable of pinpointing that additional factor and assessing it straightforwardly? Also,
one wonders why of all the major European legal systems it is the
Russians alone who balk at the presumption of innocence.
As I shall argue in this paper, the Soviet debate on the presumption of innocence highlights two important features of law and
legality in the Soviet Union: (1) it illustrates an exhortative function of legal rubrics-a function frequently ignored by those who
think of law as rules of decision; and (2) it provides the medium
for a significant institutional struggle in the Soviet system. Before
turning to a discussion of these claims, we pause to consider an
alternative account of the Soviet preoccupation with the presumption of innocence.
II. A CRITIQUE OF BERMAN'S THESIS
Professor Harold Berman has repeatedly assessed the position
of the presumption of innocence in Soviet law. His position is
that "all that American jurists generally mean by that phrase is
spelled out in Soviet law."'1 4 If this is true, then Berman is left with
only one quandary: if the Russians endorse the presumption in
substance, then why do they reject the label? In his recent book,
Soviet Criminal Law and Procedure: The RSFSR Codes, Berman
attempts to resolve this quandary with a twofold thesis. He argues
first, that as presumptions generally are alien to Soviet criminal
procedure, it is not surprising that Soviet officials should be unreceptive to the, rubric "presumption of innocence;" and secondly,
owing to the awkwardness and the inaccuracy of Russian versions
of the phrase, "the accused is presumed innocent until proven
guilty," Russian lawyers are unable to grasp the "technical meaning" of the presumption of innocence. 15 These arguments raise a
number of methodological problems in comparative legal analysis
which warrant detailed attention.
H.

JUSTICE IN THE U.S.S.R. 71 (2d ed. 1963). See also TRIAL OF
U-2 SPY PILOT xxi (Soviet Booklet No. 16 1960) .("Soviet Law has rejected the phrase 'presumption of innocence' but has retained the substance of the doctrine."); H. BERMAN, supra note 4, at 82 ("It would appear that all that is generally
meant by 'presumption of innocence' . . . is spelled out in the 1960 Code without the use
of the phrase itself.").
16 H. BERMAN, supra note 4, at 79-87.
14

AMERICAN

BERMAN,
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Berman's first explanation of the Soviet ambivalence towards
presumptions in criminal cases builds on the singularity of Continental concepts of proof and persuasion. Assessing this explanation
requires some historical clarification. Until the French Revolution,
the system of evidence that prevailed in French and other Continental courts was legalistic, formal and rule-bound. The forms of
evidence were ranked according to their weight, the testimony of
two competent eyewitnesses was binding on the court, and presumptions of every hue were a prominent means of proof.' In reaction
to what they felt to be a tyranny of evidentiary rules, the French
reformers of 1789 vested complete authority in the jury to formulate
its own judgment (intime conviction) of the facts in dispute." The
system of formal rules thus yielded to the supremacy of subjective
judgment in individual cases.
The French doctrine of subjective evidentiary judgment fared
better abroad than did Napoleon's armies; the doctrine of intime
conviction triumphed in the major court systems on the Continent.
Prussia fell to French influence after the upheaval of 1848,18 as did
Russia with the court reforms of 1864.19 The conquest of French
doctrine left in its wake a thoroughgoing disdain for presumptions
as surrogates for the proof of guilt. German lawyers no longer rely
on presumptions in proving guilt;2 0 and French and Russian jurists
rarely do.2 ' Thus Berman can argue, quite persuasively, that the
16 See *H. BRUNNER, FORSCHUNGEN ZUR GESCHICHTE DES DEUTSCHEN UND
FRAwzOSISCHEN RECHTES, ch. II (1894); A. Du BoYs, 2 HISTOIRE DU DROIT CRIMNEL
DES PEUPLES MODERNES 269-326, 358-83 (1858); A. ESMEIN, HISTORY OF CONTINENTAL

CRsINAL PROCEDURE 256-71, 288-322, App. B (Simpson transl. 1913).
17 The Law of September 16, 1791 required the following oath to be administered
to the jurors: "Vous jurez et promettez . . . de vous dieider d'apr~s les charges et
moyens de defense, et suivant votre conscience et votre intime conviction . .. ."
("You swear and promise . . . to decide according to the charges and the pleas in
defense, and following your conscience and your inner conviction . . . ."). Law of

September 16, 1791, Pt. II, Tit. V I, Art. 24. These words are retained intact in the
oath presently administered to criminal juries in France. See C. PRo. Pi.

§ 304. For

a full text and discussion of the Law of September 16, 1791, see A. ESmEIN, supra
note 16, at 416.
18 See the Law of Jan. 3, 1849, § 97; H. MEYER, THAT-UND RECHTSFRAGE IN
GESCEWORENENOERICHT 121-22 (1860). See generally C. MITTERMAIER, DIE GESETZGEBUNG uND RECATSUBibNG BER STRAFVERFAHREN 427-29, 468-72, 475-94 (1856).
19 See 1864 UGOL. PRo. KOD. [CODE CRIM. PRO.] § 666.
20 In the nineteenth century, German lawyers still spoke of the presumption
of sanity in criminal cases. See LIEROw, PROBLEME DER SCHULDVERMUTUNG IM ZUGE
DER GESCHICHTLICHEN ENTWICKLUNG DES DEUTSCHEN STRAFVERFAHRENS (1957); A.
VON FEUERBACH, LEHRBUCH DES PEINLICHEN RECETS 66 (11th ed. 1832).
21 With regard to French usage compare 2 G. STEFANI & G. LEVASSEUR, DROIT
PANAL GPNARAL ET PROCtDURE PENALE (2d ed. 1964) (no reference to presumptions
in criminal cases other than the presumption of innocence) with 2.P. BOUZAT & J.
PiNATEL, TRAITf DE DROIT P NAL ET CRIMINOLOGIE § 1230 (discussing presumptions
both of law and of fact). One of the rare cases in which a Soviet lawyer refers to
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civilian concept of proof has prompted Soviet officials to view the
presumption of innocence as they would any inculpatory presumption-with disfavor.

To buttress his claim, Berman relates the rejection of the
phrase "presumption of innocence" to a parallel 1958 decision to
avoid legislative references to the prosecutor's burden of persuasion.
Berman suggests that both of these decisions derive from two

dominant characteristics of Soviet criminal procedure: the inquisitorial role of the trial judge and the doctrine of intime conviction.
These characteristics are earmarks of the French and German as

well as the Soviet system of criminal procedure, and they may well
explain why Russian officials, like their German counterparts, are
chary of references to the prosecution's burden to prove or to persuade the court of the accused's guilt.22 Even though Russian judges
apply the European maxim in dubio pro reo-requiring acquittal in
cases of doubt-they, and not the embattled lawyers, bear final responsibility for the scope of the factual inquiry at trial. This fact,
together with the emphasis on subjective persuasion, may make it
awkward to speak of the prosecutor's duty to introduce evidence or

to persuade the court of the accused's guilt. So far as it is limited to
the question of the prosecutor's burden of persuasion, Berman's account is appealing. 3 It is difficult, however, to see how this procedural analysis assists his account of the rejection of the presumption of innocence. There is no general correlation between
presumptions in criminal cases other than the presumption of innocence, is M.
STROGOVICr, supra note 7, at 204-26 (discussing the presumptions that every man
knows the law and that judicial decisions represent accurate factual determinations).
22 German writers distinguish between jormelle Beweislast (burden of introducing
evidence) and materielle Beweislast (burden of persuasion). The German prosecutor
does not bear the former burden alone; the trial judge is bound by STPO § 244(2)
to investigate the case on his own initiative. While some nineteenth century writers
were willing to say the prosecutor bore the materielle Beweislast, see, e.g., A. VON
Kass, LEHIRBUCH DES DEUTSCHEN STRAFPROZESSRECHTS 341 (1892), contemporary
writers regard this burden as inconsistent with the prosecutor's impartial posture
in the trial. Apparently these writers wish to avoid the suggestion that the prosecutor
"loses" if the defendant is acquitted. See 1 E. ScHMIDr,
LEHRKOMMENTAR ZUR
STRAFPROZESSORDNUNG 205 (2d ed. 1964) ; ci. 1 L6WE-ROSENBERO, DIE STRAFPROZESSORDNUNG 123 (21st ed. 1963). It is significant that this argument does not appear in
the Russian literature. Unlike their German neighbors, French writers freely speak
of the prosecutor's charge de la preuve. See, e.g., G. STEFANI & G. LEVASSEUR, supra
note 21, at 21.
23 It is important to note, however, that Soviet writers display little hesitancy
is speaking of the prosecutor's burden of persuasion (bremja or objazannost' dokazyvanija). See, e.g., SOVETSKIJ UGOLOVNYJ PROTSESS. [SOVIET CRIMINAL PROCEDURE] 79
(D. Karev ed. 1956); M. STROGOVICH, supra note 4, at 186; Shifman, Diskussionnye

voprosy ugolovnogo sudoproizvodstva [Debatable Questions of Criminal Proceedings], 1957 SOTSIALISTICHESKAJA ZAKONNOST' [SOCIALIST LEGALITY] 14, 16 (No. 7).
But cf. M. CHEL'TSOV, supra note 10, at 145 (questioning the usefulness of the concept
in criminal cases).
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inquisitorial judicial roles and the doctrine of intime conviction, on
the one hand, and rejection of the phrase "presumption of innocence" on the other. Though the French and German courts are
committed to both procedural points, they display little hesitancy
in speaking of a presumption of innocence. Indeed, in both countries,
the presumption is of increasing prestige, and there is not a shred
of the kind of debate that marks the Soviet effort to come to grips
24
with the doctrine.

Berman might be right in suggesting that Soviet jurists have
confused the presumption of innocence with presumptions like those
of sanity and intention, or with common law concepts of proof and
persuasion. Yet there is hardly any evidence of this confusion in the
writings of Soviet scholars and politicians. Accordingly, Berman's
first contention remains an argument in search of support.
With his second argument, Berman shifts his focus from the
civilian theory of proof to the nature of Russian as a language for
legal discourse. He attempts to account for the 1958 rejection of
the presumption of innocence by appealing to the awkwardness of
Russian verbs corresponding to the English verb "presume." Because translations are imperfect, the argument runs, Russian versions of the maxim, "the accused is presumed innocent until proven
guilty," invariably miss the mark; and thus Soviet scholars and
officials have been unable to grasp the technical meaning of the
presumption of innocence.2 5
The argument is reminiscent of the more general view, advanced notably by Benjamin Lee Whorf, that each language reflects a unique conceptual system and that therefore speakers of
different languages see the world differently.2 6 As the Navajo does
not distinguish between blue and green, so the speaker of Russian,
per Berman, does not distinguish between the acts of presuming
and the closely related acts of regarding, considering and supposing.
According to Berman, the Russian language fails to make these
distinctions and thus the Russian lawyer becomes confused as he
24 See, e.g., Judgment of Oct. 3, 1958, in 1959 NEUE JURISTISCHE WOCHENscmurT 193, which declared inapplicable STGB § 245a requiring persons convicted of
certain offenses to prove that burglary tools found in their possession were not being
held for criminal purposes; the court cites the presumption of innocence as a ground
for not presuming that the possessor of burglary tools had a criminal purpose. See
also Patarin, Le particularisme de la thlorie des preuves en droit pinal, in QUELQUES
ASPECTS DE L'AUTONOMIE DU DROIT PENAL 5-20 (G. Stefani ed. 1956).
25 H. BERMAN, supra note 4, at 86-87.
26 See generally LANGUAGE, ThOUGHT AND REALITY: SELECTED WaTINGS
OF
BENJAMIN LEE. WHo
(Carroll ed. 1956). For a succinct summary and critique of
Whorf's views, see Black, Linguistic Relativity: The Views of Benjamin Lee Whor,
68 PHIL. REv. 228 (1959).
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attempts to fathom the "technical meaning" of the presumption of
innocence. The similarities between Berman's claim and the Whorf
hypothesis are striking.
Yet Berman goes one step further. Whorf's concern is limited
to the impact of vocabulary and syntax on the way men perceive and
"dissect" reality. As though proposing a corollary to this thesis,
Berman suggests that the existing stock of words in a language
limits the speaker's capacity to grasp the meaning of foreign words
and concepts. As he puts it, the technical meaning of the presumption of innocence has not fully "penetrated the consciousness" of
Russian-speaking lawyers. That means, I take it, that the conceptual framework of Russian inhibits understanding of the special
way common lawyers use the presumption of innocence.
There are difficulties with Whorf's position;2 7 and even more
with Berman's. It would be a sad, relativistic world indeed if the
Navajo could not grasp what his English-speaking neighbor meant
by "green," or if the Communist Chinese lawyer, even after
abundant explanation, could not fathom what the Westerner meant
by justice. (I am told that the Chinese had no word for justice
before they attempted to translate the Western concept). Yet if,
as Berman suggests, the existing stock of words in a language limits
the speaker's conceptual framework, we are led to this pessimistic
picture of trans-language communication. Before bemoaning these
insuperable barriers between legal systems, we should take a closer
look at Berman's evidence.
Of the three Russian verbs corresponding to the English verb
"presume"-predpolagat', prezumirovat', and schitat'- Berman
discusses only the latter two. 2S Neither of these, he suggests, can
generate an adequate translation of the phrase "the accused is preSee Black, supra note 26.
Of the three forms, predpolagat' is the most suitable verb for capturing the concept of the presumption. It is the only verb of the commonly used Russian equivalents
for "presume" that yields a noun form parallel to "presumption" (i.e., predpolozhenie).
Accordingly, it is the form used by Russian jurists to refer to presumptions in
private disputes. See A. KLEJNMAN, SOVETSKIJ GRAZHDANSKIJ PROTSE$S [SOvIET
CIVIL PROCEDURE] 145-47 (1964). And it is used unhesitatingly by Russian writers to
translate the presumption of innocence. See N. POLJANSKIJ, VOPROSY TEORl SOVET27
28

SKOGO UGOLOVNOGO PROTSESSA [PROBLEMS OF THE THEORY OF SOVIET CRIMINAL PRO-

182 (1956) ; S. POZNYSHEV, supra note 6, at 51. Another verb used to translate the phrase "the accused is presumed innocent" is priznat'sja, though this verb
conveys a sense of official adjudication. Apparently, this was the verb used in the
draft proposal for inclusion in the 1958 Fundamental Principles. See Baranov,
supra note 8, at 8. But cf. Golunskij, Novye Osnovy ugolovnogo sudoproizvodstva
CEDURE]

Sojuza SSR i sojuznykh respublik [The New Fundamental Principles of Criminal
Procedure of the U.S.S.R. and the Union Republics], 1959 SOVETSKOE GOSUDAR TVO I
PPAVO [SOvIET STATE AND LAW]

48, 54 (No. 2).

1968],

PRESUMPTION OF INNOCENCE

1211

sumed innocent until proven guilty." Both verbs, Berman submits,
convey a stronger meaning than does the English verb "presume."
As he suggests, the appropriate English rendition of schitat' (the
more frequently used of the two verbs he discusses) is not "presume," but "consider." Even if Berman is right in this proposed
translation, one wonders why the added force of the verb should
make the Russians unreceptive to the presumption of innocence.
Berman has an argument why it should; indeed it is the only argument on behalf of his claim that the "technical meaning" of the
presumption of innocence has not penetrated the Russian consciousness. In his words:
[T]o say that the accused "is considered" innocent is clearly inaccurate, for the prosecutor, at least, "considers" him guilty, and so does
the preliminary session of the court that confirms the indictment, while
29
the trial court has-as yet-no opinion at all in the matter.

This argument, unfortunately, proves too much. If it is sound,
it represents a serious conceptual challenge to the presumption of
innocence.30 The difference between "presume" and "consider" is, in
this context, an irrelevant matter of degree. Admittedly, "consider"
is a stronger verb than is "presume," but both convey the subject's
belief in the truth of that which is presumed or considered to be
true. A prosecutor who believes his quarry to be guilty might say,
"I consider him guilty;" or if he is less sure, he might say, "I presume that he is guilty." It is only the candor of the prosecutor's
qualified belief in guilt that makes the latter statement the slightest
bit odd. If, as Berman argues, the prosecutor's considering the accused guilty precludes saying that the accused is considered innocent, then surely the prosecutor's presuming the accused guilty
precludes saying that the accused is presumed innocent. Obviously,
Berman doesn't wish to prove that the presumption of innocence is
conceptually untenable. Thus one is unavoidably puzzled by his reliance on an argument that is applicable to the verb "presume" as well
as to the verb "consider."
Berman's reliance on the distinction between "presuming" and
"considering" derives from an incorrect perception of the problem
of translating legal doctrine. One translates a phrase from one sysH. BERMAN, supra note 4, at 87.
30 Soviet authors have relied on the same argument to demonstrate the internal
inconsistency of the presumption of innocence. See; V. LUKASHEVICH, GARANTII PRAV
29

OBVINJAEMOGO V SOVETSKOM UGOLOVNOM PROTSESSE [GUARANTEES OF THE RIGHTS OF
THE ACCUSED IN SOVIET CRIMINAL PROCEDURE] 48 (1959); SOVETSKIJ UGOLOVNYJ

[SOVIET CRIMINAL PROCEDURE] 79 (D. Karev ed. 1956); Poljanskij, K
voprosu o prezumptsii nevinovnosti v sovetskom ugolovnom protsesse [The Question
of the Presumption of Innocence in Soviet Criminal Procedure] 1949 SOvESTKoE
PROTSESS

GOSUDARSTVO I PRAVO [SOvIET STATE AND LAW]

57, 59, 62 (No. 9).
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tern of legal jargon to another.not by finding counterparts for the
constitutive words of the phrase, but by recreating the function of
the phrase as a whole. Berman's error consists in the search for a
word that corresponds to. the word "presume." Instead one should
ask: Is there a phrase in Russian that fulfills or could fulfill the role
played by the English phrase, "the accused is presumed innocent
until proven guilty?" And to answer that question one must first
be clear about the function of the presumption of innocence in common law and West European courts.
It is widely agreed today that the function of the presumption
of innocence differs from the procedural role of other rebuttable
presumptions. As Packer and Wigmore have stressed, the presumption of innocence serves primarily to offset the jury's inclination to
regard a man arrested and indicted as guilty." To bolster the image
of the accused's innocence and thus to encourage an unbiased evaluation of the evidence, the law plays a trick; it pretends that there
is a factual likelihood of innocence-a presumption of innocencewhen there is none in fact. With this indulgence in self-deception,
the rhetoric of the Western legal tradition seeks to minimize the
likelihood that innocent men will be convicted on the prestige of
the prosecutor's decision to indict. Fairness to the individual is the
end, and pretense and fiction are the means. Yet, if we are going to
indulge in fiction for the sake of fairness, we might fasten our lawyerly ingenuity for fiction to any number of phrases. We could simulate the functional impact of the presumption of innocence by saying
that "the accused is considered innocent" or that "the accused is
regarded as innocent." If the English language lacked the word "presume," we would unhesitatingly use one of these alternative forms.
The issue-in both Russian and English-is not whether one has
the linguistic apparatus to create a pretense -of the accused's innocence; the issue is whether one wants to do it.
The underlying weakness of Berman's analysis is his ambivalence toward the function of the presumption of innocence in the
Western legal tradition. He regards the presumption as a rule of
procedure allocating the burden of persuasion at trial." He thinks
of it also as a concept with a "technical meaning," though he never
81 Packer, Two Models of the Criminal Process, i13 U. PA. L. REV. 1, 12
(1964) ; 9 J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE 406-09 (3d ed. 1940).
82 In his latest work Berman lists a total of five rules for which the presumption stands: "(a) The accused has no obligation to present evidence. (b) No inference

of guilt may. be drawn from the mere fact of indictment. (c) Evidence supporting
the indictment must be presented at trial, and the judgment of the court must be based
on that evidence alone. (d) The court many not assume that the accused is
guilty. (e) If proof of guilt is not established he may not be convicted." H. BERmxw,
supra note 4, at 82. For Soviet efforts to compile lists of the specific rules encom-
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tells us what that meaning might be. 3 Yet he. ignores the role of
the presumption as. a device for counteracting the influence of the
prosecutor's pre-trial evaluation of the evidence. It is this latter
function that provides the map. to the tortuous Soviet debate on
the nature and scope of the presumption of innocence. To. grasp
this function in context, one must consider 'the array of legal precepts
that are used Similarly as devices of persuasion and. exhortation.
III. THE PRESUMPTION AS ExHORTATION

The presumption of innocence is but one of the variety of
important legal doctrines that serve not as rules of decision, but as
rhetorical gambits in legal discourse. The characteristic of these doctrines is that, although they may have the. form of legal rules, they
never emerge as major premises in judicial opinions. Nonetheless, one
speaks of these unenforceable -rules as legal rules; they represent
a significant part of the system of rhetoric with which lawyers argue legal issues. In this respect the function of the presumption
of innocence parallels the use of constitutional rules in jurisdictions in which the courts do not review the constitutionality of
legislation; these constitutional rules do not generate decisions, but
they do have rhetorical force in legal debates-.4
Unenforceable legal rules appear frequently as ascriptions
of official duties in the judicial process. A notable example is the
maxim in dubio pro reo as it functions in the German criminal
courts. The demand of the rule is clear: in a case of doubt, the trial
judge must acquit. Yet a condition for invoking the rule to reverse
a conviction upon appeal is that the trial judge must have openly
passed by the presumption of innocence, see M. CHEL'TSOV, supra note 10, at 146-47;
ENTSIKLOPEDICHESKIJ SLOVAR' PRAVOVYKII ZNANIJ [ENCYCLOPEDIC DICTIONARY OF LEGAL
CONCEPTS] 359-60 (S.Bratus' & N. Zhegin eds. 1965) ; M. STROGOVITCH, supra note 4,
at 184.
33 The term "technical meaning" appears for the first time in H. BERMAN, supra
note 4, at 86-87. In one passage, it is the verb "presume" that has a "technical
meaning." Id. at 86. In another, it is the presumption of innocence that has a
"technical meaning attached to it in English and American law." Id. at 87.
34 The preamble to the 1958 French constitution incorporates the 1789 Declaration of the Rights of Man and thus the prdsomption d'innocence in section 9 of the
Declaration has the status of droit constitutionnel. Though the preamble is not applied
as a rule of decision in specific cases, the prisomption d'innocence obviously has vast
rhetorical significance. See Patarin, supra note 24, at 15-20. Also, the U.S.S.R.
CONsT. § 111 (1936) guarantees the "right to a defense" in criminal trials. This
provision has emerged in the works of several Soviet authors as rhetorical underpinning of the presumption of innocence. See V. LuXASHEVICH, supra note 30, at
56; SOVETSXIJ UGOLOVNYJ PROTSESS [SOVIET CRIMINAL PROCEDURE] 75 (D. Karev ed.
1956) ; M. STROGOVICH, supra note 4, at 154.
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conceded his doubts in his written opinion." Though enforceable only
at this fringe, the rule does serve to exhort judges to proceed carefully
before concluding that the accused is guilty.86
The presumption of innocence typically fulfills a parallel exhortative function in common law and civilian trials. The pretense
of a factual inference of the accused's innocence admonishes the
trier-of-fact to proceed impartially-without deference to the probability that the prosecutor's decision to prosecute is well-founded.
In common law trials, the judge invokes the presumption to admonish the jury not to be swayed by the beguiling facts of arrest and
prosecution. In civilian bench trials, the admonition is more subtle:
the judge is exhorted by the rhetoric of his system to proceed cautiously and impartially in determining the facts of the case.
This exhortative role gives the words, "presumption of innocence," a significance transcending rules for the burden of persuasion
and the proof of guilt at trial. The 1960 RSFSR Code of Criminal
Procedure provides that the defendant's guilt must be established
at trial, and that the court may consider only evidence heard at
trial.8 7 The civilian rule in dubio pro reo-a precept requiring acquittal in cases of doubt-is firmly entrenched in Soviet practice.8
Yet knowing what evidence to consider is not to be free of the
impact of the prosecutor's determination of guilt in weighing competing items of proof. And a willingness to acquit the accused in
case of doubt is not to be above prosecutorial influence in determining whether a doubt exists. Even if the court limits itself to the
evidence submitted at trial and even if it demands proof beyond a
reasonable doubt, there is still the danger that it might be swayed
by the prosecutor's opinion of guilt. Guarding against that danger
is the job of the presumption of innocence.
If the rhetorical impact of the presumption of innocence is
simply to counteract prosecutorial prestige, one wonders why
Soviet scholars have debated the doctrine so vigorously. The answer
85 W. SARSTEDT, DiE REvIsIoN Di STRAFSACHEN

249-51 (4th ed. 1962); Seibert,

In dubio pro reo und Revision, 1955 NEUE JURISTISCHE WOCHENSCHRrFT 172.
86 Compare the rule of the German Code of Criminal Procedure, STPO § 160(2),
that the prosecutor must be impartial in his investigation prior to trial. The rule
prescribes a procedural role; apparently it too is enforceable only at its fringe.
There is no discussion in the commentaries of specific instances of enforcement. See
generally 2 LWE-ROSENBERO, DIE SmAFPaozEssoRDNvuo

761-64

(21st ed. 1963); 2

E. SCHzIDT, LEHRKOMMENTAR ZUR STRAPPROZESSORDNuNO 446-48 (1957). But STPO
§ 202, providing for supplementary preliminary judicial investigation, serves to check
the impact of biased prosecutorial investigations.
37 R.S.F.S.R. 1960 UGOL. PRO. KoD. [CODE CRrM.PRO.) §§ 301, 309 (1960). For an

English translation of these provisions, see, H. BismAN, supra note 4, at 372, 375.
88 See note 4 supra.
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lies, at least in part, in an additional exhortative function of the
Soviet version of the presumption of innocence. That function is
to buttress the command that the pre-trial investigator thoroughly
and impartially explore every facet of the case against the accused.
This is an exhortative function of the presumption peculiar to the
Soviet and Eastern European legal systems that has proven to be
at odds with the role of the presumption as a check on prosecutorial
prestige. It is this incompatibility of roles that has sparked the
unending controversy on the status of the presumption in Soviet
law.
To clarify the inconsistency of the presumption's roles, we
turn to some facts of Soviet criminal procedure. For our purposes,
the critical facts are these: (1) the pre-trial investigator and the
court prosecutor are both officers of the procuracy, the administrative agency that oversees all questions of legality in the Soviet
9
courts and bureaucracy; (2) the standard for issuing an indictthe suspect is guilty, and
ment is the investigator's conclusion that 40
and (3) the pre-trial
not merely a finding of probable cause;
41
investigation is thought to be an impartial inquiry. These procedural factors bestow an unusual trial posture on the court prosecutor: he is at once 'an advocate seeking to demonstrate the guilt of
the accused and a representative of a state agency that has impartially found the accused to be guilty.
Prosecutors in France, West Germany and common law jurisdictions are on a different footing. Their findings on the evidence
See generally H. BERMAN, supra note 14, at 238-47.
40 This is an uncontroverted tenet of Soviet writers. See M. STROGOVICH, supra
rule
note 4, at 182; Baranov, supra note 8, at 9; Poljanskij, supra note 30, at 62. The
§ 71, which
is supported by R.S.F.S.R. 1960 UOOL. PRO. KOD. [CODE CRIM. PRO.]
provides that the investigator and the procurator must evaluate the evidence acreach
cording to their intime conviction; presumably, the investigator could not
an intime conviction on an issue of lesser significance than the guilt or innocence of
the accused. This provision represents a change relative to § 128 of the 1923 R.S.F.S.R.
Code of Criminal Procedure, which specified that the court must reach an intime
conviction in its evaluation of the evidence, but omits reference to an intime
rule
conviction on the parts of the investigator or the procurator. The current
that the investigator must definitely decide the guilt or innocence of the accused
in a divergence from Tsarist and current Western European practice. See S.
POZNYSHEV, supra note 6, at 265, where the standard for issuing an indictment is
described as the procurator's determination that the evidence is dostatochno polnym
i dajushchim osnovanija dlja obvinenlja (adequately complete and furnishing a
basis for an accusation). One reason for the rule according to Soviet writers is that
the procuracy is charged with determining whether the suspect should be subjected
of
to pre-trial detention, and that decision, the writers claim, presupposes a finding
UGOLOVNYJ
SOVETSKIJ
51-52
at
30,
note
supra
LUKASHEVICH,
V.
See
guilt.
the suspect's
PROTSESS [SovIET CRIMINAL PROCEDURE] (D. Karev ed. 1956); Viktorov, 0 kritike
nekotorykh polozhenij v teorii sovetskogo ugolovnogo protessa [On the Criticisms
of Several Positions in the Theory of Soviet Criminal Procedure], 1958 SOvETsKoE
GOSUDARSTVO I PRAVO [SOvIET STATE AND LAW] 88, 91 (No. 3).
41 R.S.F.S.R. 1960 UcoL. PRO. KOD. [CODE CRIM. PRO.] §§ 20, 71.
39
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do not purport to be official impartial determinations of fact. Nor

can they invite assistance from a pre-trial investigator who has
made an impartial definitive finding of guilt prior to-trial. The
German Untersuchungsrichter and the French juge d'instruction
conduct. impartial investigations before issuing an. indictment, but
their conclusion is merely a finding of probable cause for commencing the prosecution.4 2 Though only a matter of degree, the
difference between a finding of probable cause and a conclusion of
guilt is significant. If the pre-trial investigator must make a definitive finding of guilt, he bears that much greater responsibility for
siftinglthe ,innocent from the guilty in the conviction process. And if
the fairness of the system turns substantially on the impartiality
and judgment of the pre-trial investigator, one quite reasonably
might exhort the investigator to do his best to avoid indicting an
innocent man. By making the presumption expressly applicable to
the pre-trial investigation, Soviet scholars seek this exhortative
effect. Stressing the likelihood of the accused's innocence counteracts the investigator's possible preconceptions of. the suspect's guilt.
By adding this exhortative function to the presumption of
innocence, Soviet scholars have generated a doctrine with competing
rhetorical tasks. If the presumption exhorts the pre-trial investigator
to make an impartial finding of guilt, how can the trier-of-fact ignore the persuasive effect of this impartial determination in his
evaluation of the evidence at trial? Yet as it.functions at trial, the
presumption exhorts the trier, to ignore the procuracy's evaluation
of the evidence-however impartial and exhaustive that evaluation
may be. Thus the Soviet presumption of innocence slides between
conflicting roles., Sometimes it functions to affirm the responsibility
of the procuracy in the guilt-determination process; sometimes it
admOnishes the trial judge to disregard the procuracy's opinion of
the defendant's guilt. With these two faces of the. presumption in
constant tension, it is not surprising that Russian scholars have
searched for two decades for the dominant face of the presumption
in Soviet law.

IV.

THE PROCURACY AND.THE

COURTS

The doctrinal parries of Soviet scholars on the presumption
of innocence shield. a .significant institutional struggle in Soviet
42 In German law the standard for commencement of the trial is that there be
hinreichender Tatverdacht (sufficient suspicion)..See STPO §. 203. The parallel French
provision is C. PRO. PAN. § 176, providing that the juge d'instruction.must determine

whether there are charges. constitutives .d'infraction against the law. See Pugh, Administration of Criminal Justice in France: An Introductory Analysis, 23 LA. L. REv.
1, 23 (1962).
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law. The struggle is for influence over, the outcome -of cases, and
the contenders are the two dominant branches of the Soviet legal
system: the procuracy and the courts., The struggle is a limited one.
No one has urged that the courts should be deprived of their exclusive power formally to declare men guilty and to prescribe punishment. Yet even within a system of indictment and judicial trial, there
is room for promoting the influence of the pre-trial investigative
agency. The evidence must be evaluated at trial. The problem is
whether the procuracy's pre-trial- conclusion should influence the
judge's evaluation at trial. The system is more efficient if the
judge can rely on the judgment of the procuracy, as he might
rely on the judgment of an expert witness. Yet to the extent that the
judiciary defers to the procuracy, the trial is that much less a
safeguard against convicting the innocent. To use Professor Packer's apt constructs, the Soviet institutional struggle reflects one of
the points of tension between the Crime Control and the Due Process
Models of the criminal process." Confidence in the judgment of
pre-trial investigative authorities is characteristic of the Crime
Control Model; insistence on the unique role of courts in the
criminal process is the mark of the Due Process Model. The conflict
is between efficiency in convicting the guilty and concern for avoiding the conviction of the innocent. These polar values collide in
various ways. In the Soviet Union, they collide at the level of an
academic debate on the nature, and scope of the presumption of
innocence.
The two faces of the presumption of innocence provide masks
for the conflict of institutional loyalties. Viewing the presumption
primarily as an exhortation to the officials of the procuracy expresses
confidence in their ostensibly objective inquiry before trial. Stressing
the role of the presumption as an exhortation to the trial judge to
proceed without deference to the procurator's judgment obviously
has the opposite thrust: it stresses the uniqueness of the courts in
the guilt-determination process.
As the institutional struggle between the procuracy and the
courts is for limited -objectives, so too is the debate among the
scholars. All proponents of the presumption agree that it applies
during the pre-trial investigation." The suspect is not entitled to
4
counsel until the investigator, reaches his conclusion to indict; 1

and thus it falls on the investigator to fulfill the role of defense
counsel as well as that of accuser. The function of the presumption,
.43

See generally Packer, supra note 31.
supra note 28, at 186;:But cf.

44 N..POLJANSKIJ,

V. :LUKASHEVICH,

supra note

30, at 49-52; M. STRoGOvICH, supra note 7, at 236; Poljanskij, supra note 30, at 59, 60.
45 R.S.F.S.R. 1960 UGOL. PRo. KoD. [CODE CaM. PRO.] §§ 47, 48.
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at this stage, is to exhort the investigator to consider the suspect's
side of the case.4 6 Indeed, Russian scholars typically contend that
the roots of the presumption lie in the suspect's constitutional right
to a defense; they see the exhortation of the presumption as a surrogate for representation by counsel.4 7
So much is common ground. The parting of positions comes in
confronting the question: what is the impact on the presumption
of innocence of the investigator's finding the suspect guilty and
issuing an indictment? This is a determination that looks much like
a judicial finding of guilt. Both the administrative and the judicial
findings are putatively impartial, and both are based on the decisionmaker's intime conviction. The investigator's decision, when ratified
by the procurator, has the procedural effect of bringing the case to
trial. The problem is whether it should also carry weight in the
adjudication of guilt at trial. This is the core of the institutional
struggle.
To abstract the issue from the fray, the scholars put it more
subtly: does the pre-trial finding of guilt displace the presumption
of innocence? Professor N. Poljanskij is the leading advocate of
the view that the pre-trial finding of guilt does displace the presumption of innocence; Professor M. Strogovich is the tenacious cham48
pion of the view that it does not.

It is easy to see how the dispute about the impact of pre-trial
findings of guilt on the presumption of innocence is, in effect, a dispute about the influence of the procuracy at trial. If one believes
that the procuracy's finding of guilt displaces the. presumption of
innocence, one attributes to the finding a legal effect pertaining
(however ambiguously) to the defendant's legal guilt. And, if that
is the case, it is hard to say that the procurator's determination of
guilt should be irrelevant in the determination of the same issue at
the next stage of the process. After all, if the procuracy (acting
through the investigator) has already "decided" the issue of guilt
and tat decision is rendered impartially, then surely it is entitled
to some weight in the conviction process. As Professor Poljanskij
argued in 1956:
40 See, e.g., the refined analysis of this point in V. LUXASHEVICHr,
supra note 30,

at 50-51.

47 See V. LUKASHEVICH, supra note 30, at 56 SOVETSKIY UGOLOVNYJ
PROTSESS
[SOVIET CRIMINAL PROCEDURE) 75 (D. Karev ed. 1956); M. STROGOVICH,
supra note
4, at 184.
48 See generally N. POLJANSKIJ, supra note 28, at 168;
M. STROGOVICH, supra
note 4, at 235. For an exposition of the compromise position
that the investigator's
findings of guilt displaces the presumption of innocence with the
presumption arising
anew at trial see V. LuICASHEVICH, supra note 30, at 55, 56.
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It is therefore impermissible to think that the court alone decides
the question of guilt. Both investigator and procurator in turn (and
in the prescribed form with the appropriate consequences) answer the
same question and both, before they can answer the question affirmasustively, are bound49to overcome every reasonable doubt as to the
pect's innocence.

To demote the courts and further the procuracy, Poljanskij
stages
erects an image of the criminal process consisting of several
of
process
the
of
stage
each
-investigation, trial and appeal-with
prothe
of
relationship
equal significance. He suggests that the
to
curacy to the courts is precisely the same as that of trial courts
of
accuracy
the
appellate tribunals, with each agency reviewing
0
factual findings made in the stage preceding."
In an effort to contain the procuracy's influence, Professor
have
Strogovich has argued fervently that pre-trial findings of guilt
the
that
is
no impact on the presumption of innocence. His position
relationpresumption describes an "objective legal relationship"-a
proship that is unaffected by the "subjective" opinions of the
investigathe
curacy."' He concedes that the pre-trial decisions of
trial;
tor and the procurator have the effect of bringing the case to
insisting
but he parries any intimation of substantive legal effect by
that the presumption of innocence is displaced only by a judicial
determination of guilt. Strogovich thus fashions the presumption
of innocence to function as it does in common law jury instructions,
namely as an exhortation to the trier-of-fact to proceed without
deference to the prosecutor's opinion of the defendant's guilt.
turns
The debate between Strogovich and his many opponents
the
of
coherence
conceptual
the
to
on a straightforward challenge
Berpresumption of innocence, the same challenge that Professor
of
presumption
the
of
mistranslation
man regards as evidence of
innocent
presumed
is
accused
the
innocence. It runs like this: If
N. PoLJAsKxij, supra note 28, at 188; cf. V. ARsEN'EV, supra note 5, at
of guilt). But see M.
134 (agreeing that the investigator "decides" the question
"in no way
49

investigator
STROGOVICH, supra note 7, at 235 (maintaining that the

pre-decides the question of guilt").
50 N. POLJANSKIJ, supra note 28, at 188. Professor Golunskij agrees with this
v sovetskom
view of the criminal process. See Golunskij, Ob otsenke dokazatel'stv
Procedure]
Criminal
Soviet
in
Evidence
of
ugolovnom protsesse [On the Evaluation
1955

SOVETSKOE rOSUDARSTVO

I PRAVO

[SOVIET

STATE AND

LAW]

70, 73

(No. 7).

this view of the
Strogovich replies to Golunskij with a categorical rejection of
n.1.
182
at
4,
note
supra
SToGOVICH,
M.
criminal process in
4, at 185; M. STROGOVICH, MA51 See generally M. STRoGOVICH, supra note

V SOVETSKOM UGOLOVNOM PROTSJESSE
TERIAL'NAJA ISTINA I SUDEBNYE DOKAZATEL'STVA
SOVIET CRIMINAL PROCEDURE] 203
IN
EVIDENCE
JUDICIAL
AND
[MATERIAL TRUTH

with Strogovich on this
(1955); M. STROGOvICH, supra note 7, at 235-36. Agreeing
supra note 30,
point are V. KAMINSHAJA, supra note 6, at 148; V. LUKASHEVICH,
at 56.
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at the beginning of the trial, then someone must presume him innocent. And who could that someone be? Not the judge, for he has
no basis in fact for presuming one way or the other. Not the
procurator, for if he presumed the accused innocent, he would
dismiss the indictment. Because no official of the system presumes
him innocent, it is wrong to say that a man indicted is presumed
to be innocent.52 The challenge is a fair one. If the presumption of
innocence is like every other presumption, then one should be able
to say that either the trier-of-fact or the procurator presumes the
defendant to be innocent. And that'is not so.
Strogovich retorts to the challenge with the flair of a practitioner of the common law. It is the law, he says, that presumes the
defendant to be innocent.5 3 Therefore, -the presumption of innocence does indeed survive the procurator's determination of the
defendant's guilt. This personification of the law has persuaded no
one. To say that the law or the legal system presumes the defendant
innocent is to indulge in fiction; it is to free the presumption of
innocence from the moorings of experience and to convert it into
an exhortation to the independence of trial judges. Only those
sharing in these purposes-as do lawyers in the common law tradition-would be willing to accept Strogovich's fictional resolution
of the perennial challenge. 54 Soviet scholars promoting the role
of the procuracy obviously see little merit in personifying the law
to make sense of a presumption of innocence at trial.
For most of the forties and fifties, the maneuvering for and
against the procuracy's influence remained dressed in these doctrinal gambits on the presumption of innocence. The debate accelerated as the drafting of the Fundamental Principles in., 1958
grew near; and in the closing months a few authors disclosed their
concern for the institutional issues at stake. For example, one author
argued that rejection of the presumption of innocence would
"diminish the role and significance of the Soviet court as the agency
of government rendering the definitive evaluation of the accused's
conduct."55 Another, although generally supportive of the presumption of innocence, expressed his concern that the presumption could
52 See note 30 supra. Strogovich summarizes the
argument in M; STROCOVICTI
supra note 4, at 185.
53 M. STROCOVICHI, supra note 4, at 185. M. STROGOVICIt,
supra note 51, at 203.
54 Those agreeing with the 1958 rejection of the phrase "presumption
of innocence" have stressed the "declaratory" nature of the doctrine. See,
e.g., Golunskij,
supra note 28, at 55.
55 Sukhodrev, K proektu Osnov ugolovnogo sudoproizvodstva
SSR i sojuznykh
respublik [Concerning the Drafting of the Fundamental.Principles.of
the Soviet and
Union Republics], 1957 SOVETSKOE GOSUDARSTVO I PRAVO [SOVIET STATE
AND LAW]
89 (No. 6).
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be used to undercut the procuracy's sense of responsibility in deciding which cases should be brought to trial. What would be the
point, he asks, of the investigator and procurator exercising caution
in deciding whether to indict if "in any event the accused would
be deemed innocent by force of law?" 56 Thus an author who endorses the language of the presumption of innocence is unwilling
to accept its potential impact on the procuracy's. influence in the
process leading to conviction.
The 1958 Fundamental Principles of Criminal Procedure
emerged as a compromise between the contending camps." The
draftsmen rejected the presumption of innocence, but they included
several provisions that partially fulfill the conflicting exhortative
functions of the presumption. Article 14 admonishes all participants
of the process-investigator, procurator and court-to use every
legal means at their disposal to investigate both sides of every issue.
Article 7 affirms the centrality of the courts in the process of
adjudicating guilt. It provides: "No one may be declared guilty of
a crime and undergo criminal punishment except by judgment of a
court." Article, 301 of the RSFSR Code of Criminal Procedure,
enacted in 1960 on the basis of the Fundamental. Principles, goes
even further in affirming the autonomy of judicial proceedings: "The
court may base its judgment solely on evidence considered at the
judicial session." If liberally interpreted, this provision might be
read as a stand against the influence of the procuracy in the evaluation of evidence at trial. The opinion of the procurator on the
defendant's guilt is not evidence considered at trial, and thus it
should have no bearing on the outcome of the case.
It might appear that Strogovich's camp won a slight victory
in the 1958 legislative reform. Yet no one ever seriously contended
that any institution but the courts should have the power formally
to declare men guilty of crime; and those promoting the procuracy
have never urged that the procuracy's opinion should actually count
as evidence. The struggle is one for influence in determining guilt,
not in drawing the formal contours of the concept of evidence. In
the former arena, it appears that the procuracy has gained ground
since 1958. According to a 1960 textbook on criminal procedure,
the investigator should decide whether particular facts or defenses
are relevant to the case. He has the power to rule out particular
avenues of inquiry; but he must support his decision with reasonspresumably to enable the trial judge to decide whether to "reverse"
56 Baranov, supra note 8, at 10.
S57 For an English translation of the. 1958 Fundamental Principles of Criminal
Procedure see 3 LAw fli EASTERN.EuoPE 113-5$.(Z. Szirmai ed. 1959).
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the investigator's opinion. 8 With respect to these rulings, the investigator's relation to the trial judge is that of a judge to his appellate superior-precisely as Poljanskij would have it.
In 1964, one of the regional procurators went so far as to
claim that the function of the procuracy is to determine guilt or
innocence before deciding to indict, and that the function of the
court is merely to decide the degree of guilt and to prescribe punishment.59 This extreme claim has evoked vigorous replies, from both
Strogovich and Justice Gorkin of the Supreme Court. 0 Both jurists
have argued anew that the courts alone decide the question of guilt;
and to bolster their positions, both have invoked variants of the
presumption of innocence. 1 The debate rages on.
V.

CONCLUSION

The institutional conflict is clear: the Soviet procuracy poses
a threat to the autonomy of the Soviet courts. The threat is not one
of usurping the courts' political independence, but of displacing
judicial evaluation of fact in routine apolitical cases. In response
to this threat, Strogovich and his supporters have deployed the
presumption of innocence precisely as it is deployed' in common law
courts: as an exhortation to the judicial trier-of-fact to proceed
independently of prosecutorial opinion. To those who think of law
as rules of decision, this effort to protect judicial autonomy may
seem curious. Soviet jurists foster judicial independence by relying not on rules, but on rhetoric. They support the status of
the courts not by thinking of the presumption of innocence as a
rule of evidence or procedure, but as a device for counteracting the
impact of the pre-trial determination of guilt. By cultivating the
rhetoric of the presumption of innocence, by pretending a presumption of innocence exists when experience suggests the contrary,
Soviet jurists have struggled to render the Soviet judicial process
independent of administrative influence. The manifestation of the
struggle is an academic debate on the nature and scope of the
presumption of innocence; the issue underlying the debate is the
status and autonomy of the Soviet criminal court.
. CUTxII,, L. MARIUPOL'SKIJ, I. SHEREMET'EV, supra note 10.
59 See Filiminov, supra note 11. This article was a response to Strogovich,
Sudebnaja oshibka [JudicialError], Literaturnaja Gazeta, May 23, 1964, at 5.
60 See Gorkin, supra note 11; Strogovich, Otvet prokuroru [Answer to the
Procurator], Literaturnaja Gazeta, Aug. 18, 1964, at 2.
01 The phrase used by Strogovich is: "Nikto ne mozhet byt' priznan vinovnym
...inache kak po prigovoru suda" ["No one may be adjudged guilty . . . except on
the basis of a judgment of a court"]. Strogovich, Sudebnaja oshibka [JudicialError],
Literaturnaja Gazeta, May 23, 1964, at 5. This is a weak formulation of the presumption of innocence which Strogovich himself criticized in M. STROGovicH, supra note
58

7, at 238. Yet it was this phrase that triggered Filiminov's attack. See Filiminov,
supra note 11.
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